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DEVELOPING THEORIES OF STATE JURISDICTION
OVER INDIANS: THE DOMINANCE OF THE
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Thomas J. Lynaugh*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme
Court decided five cases in 1976 which bear directly on the nature
and scope of state jurisdiction over the seven Indian reservations in
Montana.
The United States Supreme Court decisions, Fisher v. District
Court' and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,' origi-
nally arose in Montana. They refine prior theories on Indian juris-
diction that were most characteristically described as "befuddled." 3
The Court's decision in Bryan v. Itasca County4 complements these
cases by providing rules of construction for interpreting congres-
sional enactments purporting to confer state jurisdiction over Indian
reservations.
At the state level, the Supreme Court of Montana, in State ex
rel. Old Elk v. District Court5 and Little Horn State Bank v. Stops,I
formalized a novel approach to state jurisdiction over Indians which
it had begun to develop in its previous cases. The theory, which is
premised on the notion that state courts must fill any vacuum in
jurisdiction arising because of tribal court inaction, may be best
denominated as "Jurisdiction by Default."
This article will review the historical development of theories
of Indian jurisdiction and then will examine the recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court to determine whether they pro-
vide a consistent theoretical approach to the question of state juris-
diction over Indian reservations. In this connection, particular at-
tention will be directed to the continuing vitality of the doctrine of
Williams v. Lee,7 which purported to establish a rule for determin-
ing whether states had jurisdiction over transactions involving Indi-
* Partner of the law firm of Cate, Lynaugh and Fitzgerald, Billings, Montana. General
counsel for the Crow Tribe of Indians since April 1974. J.D. 1968, Boston College Law School.
The author is indebted to Jeff Essman of the MONTANA LAw REVIEW for his valuable assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
2. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
3. See Note, State Civil Jurisdiction Over Tribal Indians-A Re-examination, 35 MoNT.
L. REv. 340 (1974).
4. 96 S. Ct. 2102 (1976).
5. - Mont. , 552 P.2d 1394 (1976).
6. - Mont. -, 555 P.2d 211 (1976).
7. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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ans and non-Indians. Finally, this article will critique the recent
decisions of the Montana Supreme Court and the practical and
theoretical base upon which the newly-developed concept of Juris-
diction by Default rests.
II. A REVIEW OF THEORIES CONCERNING STATE JURISDICTION OVER
INDIAN LANDS AND PEOPLE
A. Analytical Premises and Changing Congressional Policies in
Indian Law.
Any analytical approach to Indian jurisdiction will be valueless
unless it recognizes the different types of jurisdiction involved and
the importance of the varying congressional attitudes toward the
Indian through the years.
Cases arising in Montana have dealt with all three types of
jurisdiction: personal jurisdiction over the Indian party,8 subject
matter jurisdiction over the litigated controversy,' and jurisdiction
or power of the State to impose its general regulatory authority on
lands and people within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reser-
vation.'0 In viewing the theories and the cases, it is important to
distinguish the different questions of jurisdiction that arise. A par-
ticular case could require consideration of State-Indian jurisdiction
of all three types.
For example, a reservation Indian incurs a loan with a non-
Indian creditor off-reservation and defaults in payments on the
loan. The creditor brings an action in state court, thereby raising a
question of subject matter jurisdiction. Service of the summons and
complaint takes place at the reservation home of the Indian debtor
thereby raising a personal jurisdiction issue. Assuming a court de-
cided those two issues adversely to the Indian debtor and rendered
a judgment against him, the third jurisdictional question, the right
of the State to impose its general regulatory authority on the Indian
or his reservation property, would arise when the creditor attempts
to enforce judgment by attachment, garnishment, or execution
under state process within the boundaries of the reservation.
Changing congressional policies toward Indians have affected
the development of State-Indian jurisdictional law. As an infant
nation, the United States negotiated Indian treaties to secure peace-
ful borders. After the British left the continent following the War
of 1812, however, the tribes lost much of their bargaining power and
8. Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, 847 (1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 847 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Security State Bank v. Pierre, 162 Mont. 298, 511 P.2d 325 (1973).
10. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
[Vol. 38
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the negotiations became increasingly one-sided." Congressional
treatment of Indians then became not a systematic policy, but a
series of ad hoc solutions to momentary problems with little thought
to long-range consequences.' 2
A policy of separation began in the 1830's with enactment of a
law providing for the removal of Indians to lands west of the Missis-
sippi. 13 Later, after most of the tribes settled on reservations, Con-
gress ended its treaty power with the Indians." Congressional enact-
ment in 1887 of the General Allotment (Dawes) Act evidenced a
shift from the policy of separation to a policy of assimiliation."
The policy of assimilation favored the gradual dissolution of the
unique trust status accorded Indians and Indian lands and the as-
sumption of full jurisdiction by the states. The Dawes Act provided
for individual allotments of reservation trust lands to tribal
members. After a specified period of trust ended, the Indian allotee
would receive a land patent and become a citizen subject to the
State's jurisdiction. Land within reservation boundaries which ex-
ceeded that required for the allotments to Indians was opened for
non-Indian settlement. The implementation of this Act led to loss
of Indian control over land and resources within reservation bound-
aries. The resultant influx of non-Indians onto reservation land in
large part created the complex social and legal problems of Indian
reservations which the courts face today."
Congressional adoption in 1934 of the Wheeler-Howard Indian
Reorganization Act'7 reversed the trend toward assimilation. In-
tending to preserve Indian government and the Indian land base,
the Act restored land to tribal ownership and provided for organiza-
tion of tribal governments under written constitutions. Less than
twenty years later, however, the pendulum swung again toward as-
11. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALiF. L. REV. 601,
608-611 (1975).
12. Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CAUF. L. REv. 445, 454
(1970). This article contains a full examination of the history of congressional regulations of
Indian affairs, and the corresponding judicial response, from which this brief treatment is
drawn.
13. Act of May 28, 1930, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
14. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544.
15. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 381 (1970)).
16. The Dawes Act scheme of allotments also resulted in a checkerboard pattern of land
status where tribal trust land, individual allotted Indian trust land, Indian owned fee-patent
land, and non-Indian owned fee-patent land are intermingled within reservation boundaries.
The Supreme Court has rejected attempts to base state jurisdiction on the status of land
because of the inherent problems of "checkerboard jurisdiction" and contrary congressional
policy. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478 (1976); Seymour
v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
17. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970)).
1977]
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similation. Enactment of Public Law 28018 extended the criminal
and civil jurisdiction of certain States to Indian reservations. The
Act also permitted any other States to assume jurisdiction over
Indian country by complying with certain procedures. 0 During the
same period in the early 1950's, Congress furthered its policy of
assimilation by terminating the special relationship between the
federal government and the tribal Indians of certain reservations.'
Because the termination of reservations met with a strong nega-
tive reaction, present congressional and executive policy has re-
treated from the totally assimilative policy of the Termination Acts.
Recent legislation most directly affecting this issue is the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968.22 Although the Act requires tribal govern-
ments to conform with many national standards of governmental
behavior, 3 it does reaffirm certain aspects of tribal sovereignty.
Congress replaced section seven of Public Law 280 with provisions
requiring tribal consent to any state assumption of civil or criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country.24 Furthermore, Congress allowed any
18. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in part as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)).
19. Those states were California, Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation), Ne-
braska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin. The territory of
Alaska was added to the list by Act of August 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545,
amending 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970).
20. Section 7 of Public Law 280 provides: "The Consent of the United States is hereby
given to any other state not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes
of action or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such
time and in such manner as the people of the state, shall, by affirmative legislative action
obligate and bind the state to the assumption thereof." Section 6 of the Act also provided
federal consent to constitutional amendment or statutory repeal of restrictive provisions of
enabling acts of the States so that civil and criminal jurisdiction could be assumed. In
accordance with Section 7 of this Act, and pursuant to REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947),
§§ 83-801 to 806, Montana assumed criminal jurisdiction over the Flathead Indian Reserva-
tion. See State ex rel. McDonald v. District Court, 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d 78 (1972). There
has been no such statutory assumption of jurisdiction, either civil or criminal, over any of
the remaining Montana reservations.
21. Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-901 (Menominee); Act
of August 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718, 25 U.S.C. § 564 (Klamath); Act of August 23, 1954,
ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768, 25 U.S.C. § 721 (Texas Tribes); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1207, 68 Stat.
1099, 25 U.S.C. § 741-60 (1970) (Paiute).
22. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970).
23. See Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial Error in Con-
struction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D. L. Rxv. 1 (1975); DeRaismes, The Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.D. L.
REv. 59 (1975).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970) provides:
Special Election. State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this title [25 U.S.C. §§
1321-1326] with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect
to both, shall be applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians
within the affected area of such Indian country accept jurisdiction by a majority
vote of the adult Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose. The
Secretary of Interior shall call such special election under such rules and regulations
4
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State to return civil or criminal jurisdiction of an Indian reservation
to the federal government. 5 The Act specified that a State could
amend its constitution to remove any legal impediment to the as-
sumption of jurisdiction. 2 The Indian Civil Rights Act and other
recent enactments 27 show a strong congressional commitment to
tribal autonomy.
as he may prescribe, when required to do so by the tribal council or other governing
body or by 20 per centum of enrolled adults.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970) provides:
Retrocession of Jursidiction by State. 5(a) The United States is authorized to
accept a retrocession by any State of all or any measure of the criminal or civil
jurisdiction, or both, acquired by such State pursuant to the provisions of section
1162 of Title 18 of the United States Code, section 1360 of Title 28 of the United
States Code, or section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as it was in
effect prior to its repeal by subsection (b) of this section.
26. 25 U.S.C. §1324 (1970) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisons of any enabling act for the admission of a State, the
consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend,
where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be,
to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction
in accordance with the provisions of this title. The provisions of this title shall not
become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State
until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or
statutes as the case may be.
A legal impediment to the exercise of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations exists in
Montana. The federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over Indian lands was recognized
as early as 1864 in the Organic Act of the Territory of Montana. The Act of May 26, 1864, 13
Stat. 676, authorizing formation of the state, specifically provides that the State of Montana
lacks jurisdiction over Indian land within the State until the title of the Indian or Indian Tribe
has been extinguished. Until such extinguishment of title, the lands involved are subject to
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. Act of February 22,
1889, 25 Stat. 676. Ordinance No. 1 Section II of the 1889 Montana Constitution expressly
ratified and accepted the foregoing jurisdictional exclusion of Indian lands as provided in
the Enabling Act.
The 1972 Montana Constitution reaffirmed the provisions of the Organic Act in Article
I:
All provisions of the Enabling Act of Congress (Approved February 22, 1889, 25
Stat. 676), as amended and of Ordinance No. 1, appended to the Constitution of
the State of Montana and approved February 22, 1889, including the agreement and
declaration that all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States,
continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the United States
and the people of Montana.
Therefore under the Indian Civil Rights Act, Montana would have to take two steps to
assume jurisdiction over other reservations. First, the provisions of the Organic Act must be
amended to remove the impediment of the jurisdictional disclaimer. Second, a majority of
the enrolled adult reservation Indians must vote to accept State jurisdiction.
27. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970), the Tribal Federal Jurisdiction Act, which permits
tribes to bring actions in their own right in federal courts; 25 U.S.C. §§1451-1593 (Supp. IV
1974), the Indian Financing Act of 1974, which established a loan fund to assist tribes and
reservation Indians in economic development projects; 25 U.S.C. §§450-450n, 455-458e
(Supp. IV 1974), the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, allowing
tribes to contract for tribally operated schools independent from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
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B. Judicial Canons of Construction
To meet changing congressional policy, the Supreme Court,
recognizing the federal trust responsibility to Indians28 and the une-
qual bargaining power of tribes, has developed canons of construc-
tion as analytical aids. In construing treaties,29 the Court has devel-
oped three primary rules:30 (1) ambiguous expressions are resolved
in favor of the Indian parties;3' (2) Indian treaties must be inter-
preted as the Indians themselves would have understood them;32
and (3) Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the
Indians.3 A corollary to these canons is the doctrine that Indian
treaties are not a grant of rights to tribes, but a grant of rights from
them.3'
The last of the three canons has been logically applied in the
area of statutory construction as well. In that context, the rule of
construction is that "statutes passed for the benefit of the Indians
are to be liberally construed and all doubts are to be resolved in
their favor. ' 35 The Supreme Court recently has been inclined to
construe legislation affecting reservation Indians "in light of inter-
vening legislative enactments."3 1 Although that may not be properly
28. A complete discussion of the development of the federal trust responsibility to
Indians is contained in Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility
to Indians, 27 STA. L. Rav. 1213 (1975).
29. The trust relationship and reservation status can also be created by executive orders,
agreements, statutes, and withdrawals by the Secretary of Interior. The same canons of
construction used for treaties are applied to situations involving alternative methods of reser-
vation recognition. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Treaty Abrogation, supra note
11, at 615-16. See also Francisco v. State, - Ariz. - , 556 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1976).
30. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Treaty Abrogation, supra note 11, at 615-
16.
31. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973);
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1908). See also United States v. Finch, No. 75-2149 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1976).
32. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
33. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431 (1934); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d
334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
34. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation, supra note 11,
at 619.
35. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 96 S.Ct. 1793, 1797 n. 7 (1976); Squire
v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366 (1930); Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). An outgrowth of this rule of statutory construction is the
doctrine applied to claims that reservations or Indian rights were terminated: a congressional
determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the act, or be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). See also Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1967).
36. Bryan v. Itasca County, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2110 (1976), citing Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976).
6
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termed a canon of construction, it may develop into a significant
tool of interpretation in light of an apparent congressional propens-
ity for changing federal Indian policy.
C. The Notion of Tribal Sovereignty
In the early cases involving questions of the scope and extent
of state jurisdiction, courts described Indian tribes as sovereign na-
tions, subject by conquest and later by treaties to the regulations
of the federal government."
In the notable and often quoted decision of Worcester v.
Georgia, 3 1 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, held that
state statutes which attempted to regulate activities within the re-
servation were unlawful under the supremacy clause. After carefully
analyzing the treaties to refute the "conquered subjects" theory of
Justices Johnson and Baldwin in the earlier Cherokee Nation case,
Marshall construed the treaties and the Indian Trade and Inter-
course Acts as defining the Indian status as: "[D]istinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their au-
thority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the
United States." 9 However, the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts,
like the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the statutes of the Conti-
nental Congress, only dealt with land ownership, not self-
government. Marshall thus went behind the language of the statute
to discern a congressional purpose to safeguard tribal self-
government as well as land ownership.1°
Since the evolution of the Worcester principle is discussed at
length in the major treatises4' on Indian law there will be no at-
tempt to fully re-examine that development here. Felix Cohen best
summarized the state of law after Worcester, but before the 1959
decision of the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee:4"
37. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the case which first
outlined the guardian-ward theory of federal Indian relationships, the Supreme Court held
that it lacked original jurisdiction because a tribe was not a foreign state within the meaning
of that term in Article III of the Constitution. The Court relied on the past practice and
dealings between the tribes and the young nation in deciding that the tribes would best be
called "domestic dependent nations."
38. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
39. Id. at 557.
40. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
supra note 28, at 1218. The Supreme Court in the modern era of Indian jurisdiction conflicts
has also followed the practice of looking behind statutes and treaties to discern a congres-
sional policy to preserve tribal self-government. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382,
386-88 (1976).
41. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122-26 (1942); M. PRICE, LAW AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 33-65 (1973).
42. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
1977]
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The whole course on the natures of Indian tribal power is marked
by adherence to three fundamental principles:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers
of a sovereign state.
(2) Conquest renders the tribes subject to the legislative power
of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into
treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the inter-
nal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-
government.
(3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties, and by
express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly quali-
fied, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian
tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.43
Worcester additionally stood for two broad propositions: (1)
States have no inherent power to impose their laws on matters in-
volving only Indians on Indian reservations; and (2) States have no
inherent power to impose their laws with respect to matters involv-
ing non-Indians on the reservation."
With the passage of time and the changes in congressional
policy towards Indians and Indian tribes, however, the notion of
tribal sovereignty within reservation boundaries changed. One
change created an exception to the Worcester doctrine by allowing
state jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country if its exercise
did not interfere with the federal duty to protect Indians." The
second Worcester principle, regarding non-Indians, was also modi-
fied to allow an Indian to bring a civil action in state court for
actions committed by a non-Indian within the boundaries of an
Indian reservation." Unfortunately, some Montana cases have erro-
neously relied on this concept of Indian access to state courts be-
cause of federal and state citizenship to impose state jurisdiction
over Indian reservations. 7
Some states also attacked the first broad proposition derived
from Worcester, that states have no power over actions involving
only reservation Indians. These States reasoned that, absent spe-
43. COHEN, supra note 41, at 123.
44. See Sullivan, State Civil Power over Reservation Indians, 33 MONT. L. RPv. 291,
295-97 (1972), for a discussion of these propositions and subsequent judicial modifications.
45. Indian Civil Rights Task Force, Development of Tripartite Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 22 KAN. L. Rav. 354, 370-80, 383 (1970).
46. United States v. Candeleria, 271 U.S. 432 (1920); Woodtick v. Crosby, - Mont.
__ 544 P.2d 812 (1976); McCrae v. Busch, 164 Mont. 442, 524 P.2d 781 (1974); Bonnet v.
Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317 (1952).
47. See, e.g., State ex rel. Firecrow v. District Court, __ Mont. __, 536 P.2d 190
(1975), rev'd per curiam sub. nom. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Bad Horse
v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974).
[Vol. 38
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cific congressional legislation in an area, a State was permitted to
exercise jurisdiction." Thus, the usefulness of the concept of tribal
sovereigty as an absolute bar to state jurisdiction declined.
The Supreme Court has recently delineated the use of tribal
sovereignty in resolving State-Indian jurisdiction. After reviewing
the course of decisions which have adjusted "notions of Indian sov-
ereignty to take account of the state's legitimate interests in regulat-
ing the affairs of non-Indians,"50 Justice Thurgood Marshall stated
the current view of the Supreme Court toward tribal sovereignty:
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sover-
eignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal
preemption [citing cases]. The modem cases thus tend to avoid
reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look in-
stead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the lim-
its of state power [citing cases].
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but be-
cause it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties
and federal statutes must be read.5'
The Court thus relegated the concept of tribal sovereignty to a
background position on which the specific treaties and statutes af-
fecting a particular tribe are considered to determine the extent of
state jurisdiction, if any.5 2
D. The Williams Infringement Test
After the passage of Public Law 280 and the termination acts,
the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee,53 a case involving sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of a state court over a debt action brought
by a non-Indian against a reservation Indian for a debt incurred
within the reservation. The Court attempted to rationalize the ear-
lier cases and to create a method of balancing Indian interests in
self-government and the federal responsibility toward Indian tribes
with the limited, but legitimate state interest involved.
48. Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957); Tenorio v. Tenorio, 44 N.M.
89, 98 P.2d 838 (1940). The validity of the reasoning of these cases is doubtful in view of the
recent Supreme Court decisions examined later in this article. See pp. 82-92 infra. Vermil-
lion was specifically overruled by Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
49. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
50. Id. at 171.
51. Id. at 172.
52. For discussion of the effect of tribal sovereignty on the mineral development of
Indian reservations, see articles to be published in 22 RoCKY MOUNTMIN MIN. L. INsT. See
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), for a decision supporting the exercise of
tribal sovereignty over non-Indians within the reservation.
53. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
19771
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The result was not only a strong rejection of state jurisdiction
over a debt arising within the reservation,54 but also the establish-
ment of a test for determining when the State would have jurisdic-
tion of matters within the Indian reservation. That test was stated
as follows: "absent governing acts of Congress the question has al-
ways been whether state action infinged on the right of reservation
Indians to make their laws and be ruled by them."5
Although the rule is easily stated, it has proven difficult to
apply consistently. The Williams test has produced significant deci-
sions protecting Indian self-government from interference by state
jurisdiction,56 but it has also created many problems for advocates
of Indian autonomy. The most paradoxical use of the Williams test,
in light of its purpose to limit the exercise of state jurisdiction, is
the out-of-context application of the test, combined with cases in-
volving non-Indian57 and off-reservation situations," to support
broad arguments that a State has jurisdiction over Indians on their
reservations.
The Williams test has spawned some theories of Indian jurisdic-
tion, including "residual jurisdiction" and "jurisdiction by de-
fault", which, from the tribal viewpoint, are quite destructive to
54. Id. at 223. Several statements made by the Court, often overlooked by proponents
of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations, support the proposition that states, in general,
have no such jurisdiction. For example: "Congress has also consistently acted upon the
assumption that the states have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation."
Id. at 211. Although the Court did not explicitly state that Congress had preempted state
jurisdiction, it is possible that the concept of federal preemption underlay its reasoning and
supported its result independently of its finding of infringement on tribal government. Note
particularly the Court's discussion of treaties and legislation, including Public Law 280. Id.
at 220-23.
55. Id. at 221.
56. See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969); Smith v.
Temple, 82 S.D. 650, 152 N.W.2d 547 (1967); State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 57
Wash.2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960). See also Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
380 U.S. 685 (1965). While the Court found the application of an Arizona tax on a reservation
trading post to be a burden and impliedly an infringement on Indian trading, the concept of
federal preemption is clearly evident in the Court's discussion of a comprehensive federal
scheme: "These apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes authorizing them would
seem in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading
on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional
burdens upon traders." Id. at 690.
57. Cases often cited in this manner include Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711
(1945); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1945); Donnelly v. United States, 228
U.S. 243 (1913); and Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
58. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). See PRICE, supra
note 41, at 196-202, for a comparison of Kake, Warren Trading Post, and Williams v. Lee.
See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 n. 15 (1973), where
the Court notes the limited usefulness of Kake for determining Indian jurisdictional disputes:
"It [Kake] did not purport to provide guidelines for the exercise of state authority in areas
set aside by treaty for the exclusive use and control of Indians."
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tribal self-government." Another difficulty with the Williams test
is that it provides no standard for measuring infringement on tribal
self-government. Unfortunately, this has led to unsupported
extensions of state jurisdiction over Indians and reservations. 0
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, the Su-
preme Court clarified "infringement", and limited the applicability
of the Williams test."' The Arizona court of appeals held that since
the Arizona income tax applied only to individual Indians, there
was no infringement with the collective right to tribal self-
government."2 In rejecting that reasoning, the Supreme Court lim-
ited the Williams test to situations involving non-Indians.63
Although the Court in Williams attempted to provide a useful
guideline for determining the scope of state jurisdiction, time has
shown that the test is largely unworkable because it cannot provide
a consistent method for resolving Indian jurisdictional disputes. The
infringement test has therefore been overshadowed by the clear
emergence of the preemption analysis in more recent cases.
59. The use of the theory of "jurisdiction by default" discussed infra, pp. 79-81, in-
fringes on tribal self-government because it is invoked by the Supreme Court of Montana
when the tribe involved has not enacted a tribal code, consistent with state law, dealing with
the particular problem that is the subject of the jurisdictional dispute.
60. See, e.g., County of Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264 Minn. 406, 119 N.W.2d
25, 31 (1963); State ex rel. Nepstad v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689 (1967); Sangre
Decristo Dev. Corp. v. City of Sante Fe, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323, 330-31 (1972); Paiz v.
Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51, 53 (1966); Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 467 (N.D.
1968).
61. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
62. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221, 224 (1971),
rev'd sub nom. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
63. The Court stated:
[W]e are far from convinced that when a state imposes taxes upon reservation
members without their consent, its action can be reconciled with Tribal self-
determination. But even if the State's premise were accepted, we reject the sugges-
tion that the Williams test was meant to apply in this situation. It must be remem-
bered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations
involving non-Indians. See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. at
75-76. In these situations, both the Tribe and the state could fairly claim an interest
in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve
this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point
where tribal self-government would be affected.
The problem posed by this case is completely different. Since appellant is an
Indian and since her income is derived wholly from reservation sources, her activity
is totally within the sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the
Federal Government and for the Indians themselves. Appellee cites us to no cases
holding that this legislation may be ignored simply because tribal self-government
has not been infringed. (emphasis added).
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973).
Although McClanahan seemingly clarified application of the infringement test, the Su-
preme Court in Fisher again muddied the waters. See discussion infra, pp. 84-85.
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E. Federal Preemption Analysis in Indian Law
The first significant break from the Williams infringement test
came in Kennerly v. District Court." In 1967, the Blackfeet Tribal
Council enacted a Tribal law providing that the Tribal court and
the State should have concurrent jurisdiction over all actions where
the defendant was a member of the Blackfeet Tribe. However, the
state legislature thereafter did not take the actions required under
Public Law 280 to enable the State to assume jurisdiction,"5 nor was
Tribal consent given to the State's assumption of jurisdiction under
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 which required a majority
affirmative vote of the adult reservation Indians."
A non-Indian creditor commenced a suit in a Montana district
court against Indian residents of the reservation on a debt incurred
within the reservation. At issue was the subject matter jurisdiction
of the state court over a transaction occurring on the reservation.
Reasoning that the 1967 Tribal Council resolution demonstrated
that tribal self-government was not infringed by state court jurisdic-
tion, the Montana Supreme Court ruled the state court had jurisdic-
tion. 7 On appeal the United States Supreme Court determined the
crucial issue was not whether infringement in fact occurred, but
whether the procedures for cession of jurisdiction required by federal
law had been completed. Because the action of the Blackfeet Tribal
Council occurred prior to the 1968 passage of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, the Supreme Court considered first whether the tribal council
resolution was sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to Montana under
Public Law 280, and then whether it was sufficient under the 1968
Indian Civil Rights Act provisions. 6
Stating that "[tlhe unilateral action of the Tribal Council was
insufficient to vest Montana with jurisdiction over Indian country
under the 1953 Act," 9 the Supreme Court ruled that the state court
had no jurisdiction since the state legislature had taken no affirma-
tive action under Public Law 280.76 The Supreme Court also ruled
that the State did not acquire jurisdiction under the 1968 Indian
Civil Rights Act because the tribe had not held a special election.7
The holding in Kennerly looked strictly toward compliance
with federal statutes and as a result conflicted with the Williams
64. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
65. See discussion note 20, supra.
66. See discussion notes 24 and 26, supra.
67. State ex rel. Kennerly v. District Court, 154 Mont. 488, 466 P.2d 85, 90 (1970), rev'd
per curiam sub nom. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
68. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 426 n. 2 (1971).
69. Id. at 427.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 428-29.
(Vol. 38
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infringement test. In Williams, the question was whether in the
absence of a governing act of Congress, "the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them."7 Kennerly, however, said that Public Law 280 was
a "governing act of Congress."7 Thus, the Williams factual infringe-
ment test was in fact superfluous, because Public Law 280 was in
full force and effect in Arizona at the time of Williams v. Lee, as it
was in Montana at the time of Kennerly.71
Since Kennerly looked solely to compliance with the procedural
mechanics for the transfer of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 and
the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, it provided clear guidelines to date
for determination of state court subject matter jurisdiction con-
flicts. If the purported transfer occurred after 1953 but before the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, it is governed by the provisions of
Public Law 280. If the state has taken no affirmative legislative
action, no transfer can occur. If the purported transfer occurred
after 1968, then the Indian Civil Rights Act applies. If a majority of
adult reservation Indians do not vote in a special election to fully
or partially accept state civil or criminal jurisdiction, the State is
without subject matter jurisdiction even if the State affirmatively
asserts jurisdiction. In establishing this apparently simple approach
to state-Indian jurisdictional disputes, Kennerly signaled the
changing attitude of the Supreme Court toward Indian jurisdiction
and marked the beginning of the modern doctrine of federal
preemption in Indian jurisdictional matters.
Generally, federal preemption of an area occurs when congres-
sional treatment of the area is pervasive or otherwise shows a con-
gressional intent to fully occupy the area. Under the supremacy
clause, the State is then divested of any authority to exercise juris-
diction. While the concept of federal preemption is applied in a
restricted fashion in other areas of federal supremacy, such as in
regulation of interstate commerce, federal preemption is given
broader meaning in the context of federal Indian policy.
This interpretation results from two considerations which are
unique to the area of federal control of Indian affairs. First, since
the traditional principle has been that States are without jurisdic-
tion over Indian reservations unless expressly authorized, the Court
is searching for a grant of state jurisdiction rather than a divest-
ment of state jurisdiction. Second, congressional actions in the con-
text of Indian affairs are analyzed with the aid of canons of construc-
72. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959).
73. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971).
74. See Israel and Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic
Development, 49 N.D. L. REv. 267, 279 (1973).
19771
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tion which vary greatly from principles which are applied in the
ordinary context of federalism. As analysis of the most recent
United States Supreme Court decisions treated later in this article
will show, the Court does not require the federal or tribal action
alleged to preempt state jurisdiction to meet the rigorous require-
ments imposed in the interstate commerce context in order to find
a congressional intent to preempt.
Two Montana cases decided in the wake of Kennerly followed
the black letter law of the emerging federal preemption analysis. In
Crow Tribe v. Deernose,7 5 the Crow Tribe of Indians brought a fore-
closure action in state court on trust property located within the
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation pursuant to a mortgage
between the Tribe and an enrolled tribal member. The Tribe argued
that a federal statute relating to mortgages on alloted Indian trust
lands7" was intended to terminate trust status and subject Indian
foreclosure actions to state court jurisdiction.77 In rejecting this
argument, the Montana Supreme Court followed the preemption
analysis of Kennerly, finding a failure to meet the requirements of
either Public Law 280 or the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act." The
court stated that the other federal statute in question was not a
statute granting jurisdiction, but rather one authorizing the mort-
gaging of trust land.79
In Blackwolf v. District Court, s0 three Indian juveniles who were
enrolled members of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe had been
found by a tribal court to be guilty of delinquency within the reser-
vation. Pursuant to a tribal ordinance,8 the tribal court transferred
the juveniles to the control of the state district court. In view of
Kennerly, the court ruled the State had been granted no jurisdiction
to entertain these juvenile matters. 2
The United States Supreme Court clarified and elaborated
75. 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971).
76. 25 U.S.C. §483a (1970).
77. Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133, 1134 (1971).
78. Id. at 1136.
79. Id.
80. 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972).
81. Revised Law and Order Code of Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Chapter IV, Sec-
tion 4, Juvenile Delinquency, Paragraph 9(4):
If the court shall find that this child is delinquent within the provision of this
ordinance, it may, by order duly enter and proceed as follows: . . . (4) Order the
child delivered into the appropriate juvenile department of the District Court for
such disposition as it may make through use of its facilities and institutions pro-
vided by the State of Montana in the interests of the child and of the Tribe and of
the State, provided that, upon the assumption of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court
of the Judicial District by means of this section, the jurisdiction of the Tribal court
shall end.
82. Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293, 1294-95 (1972).
[Vol. 38
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upon the Kennerly federal preemption analysis in McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission.3 The issue was whether Arizona
could impose its state income tax on an enrolled member of the
Navajo Tribe living and working within the exterior boundaries of
the Navajo Indian reservation. The Arizona court of appeals ruled
that the tax was valid because it did not infringe on the Navajo's
powers of self-government. 4
In reversing, the Supreme Court refined the preemption analy-
sis by considering, against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty,
whether the federal government had preempted state jurisdiction by
treaties or statutes which enhanced, preserved, or otherwise recog-
nized tribal self-government. The Court interpreted the language of
the Navajo treaty as creating an exemption from state taxes. 5 The
Court also found that the language of the Arizona Enabling Act,86
disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian lands, indicated a federal intent
to exempt Indians from state taxation. 7
The major effect of McClanahan was to focus the determination
of state jurisdiction over Indians and reservations on an examina-
tion of the particular treaties and federal statutes affecting the tribe
involved in the jurisdictional dispute. The Court's approach in
McClanahan clearly reaffirmed the preemption analysis as the pri-
mary method of resolving State-Indian jurisdictional disputes, di-
verting judicial attention from the infringement test formulated in
Williams.
F. The Theory of Residual Jurisdiction
Shortly after McClanahan reaffirmed the Supreme Court's use
of the preemption analysis, the Supreme Court of Montana relied
on a new theory to support state court jurisdiction over reservations.
In State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court,"s the court ruled that a
state district court had jurisdiction to entertain a divorce action
between two enrolled members of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribe who
both resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. At issue in the
83. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
84. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 222, 224 (1971),
rev'd sub nom. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
85. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1973). In its
examination of the Navajo treaty the Court noted that there was no explicit statement
exempting Navajos from State taxation, but relied on the principle that doubtful treaty
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indians, citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363,
367 (1930). The Court also examined the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §105 et seq. and determined
that section 109 of the Act prevented the application of section 106(a), which established a
taxation scheme for federal areas, unless specifically authorized. 411 U.S. at 176.
86. 36 Stat. 569.
87. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 (1973).
88. 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1973).
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case was the effect of a 1938 Tribal resolution which ostensibly
transferred jurisdiction over marriages and divorces from the Tribe
to the State. Since Kennerly limited its treatment to purported
cessions of jurisdiction after the passage of Public Law 280, the
Montana court in Iron Bear had to consider whether there was a
valid cession of jurisdiction by the Tribe prior to 1953.
In its decision, the Montana court limited Kennerly to its facts
by holding that, prior to the 1953 passage of Public Law 280, a tribe
had complete authority to transfer jurisdiction to the State.9 Once
this jurisdiction was transferred, it became "residual jurisdiction"
which could not be wrested from the State absent explicit congres-
sional or tribal action." It must be emphasized that the crux of the
residual jurisdiction theory is that a tribe, prior to 1953, had the
unrestricted authority to transfer jurisdiction."' If a tribe transferred
jurisdiction over an area, such as domestic relations, Public Law 280
would not therefore be a "governing act" as to jurisdictional trans-
fers that occurred prior to its adoption. The Montana Supreme
Court found no act of Congress governing divorces and no tribal
mechanism for the granting of divorces." Thus, the court reasoned,
the exercise of jurisdiction by the State could in no way interfere
with tribal self-government.93 The court then formulated a three-
prong test for determining when subject matter jursidiction over
certain matters remained in the State after the enactment of Public
Law 280:
Before a district court can assume jurisdiction in any matter sub-
mitted to it, it must find subject matter jurisdiction by determin-
ing: (1) whether the federal treaties and statutes applicable have
preempted state jurisdiction; (2) whether the exercise of state ju-
risdiction would interfere with reservation self-government and (3)
whether the Tribal Court is currently exercising jurisdiction or has
exercised jurisdiction in such a manner as to preempt state juris-
diction. 4
This rule was later applied by the Montana Supreme Court in
89. Id. at 1296-97.
90. Id. at 1297. The principle that explicit action is necessary to deny the State residual
jurisdiction is predicated on the cases of Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186 (1937);
United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925); and Fort Leavenworth R.R. v.
Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
91. Although not cited in Iron Bear, precedent supporting the concept may exist.
United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925); See also 25 U.S.C. §231 (1970),
which provides that a tribe with a governing body can consent to State jurisdiction regarding
compulsory school attendance.
92. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292, 1297 (1973).
93. Id. But see Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1959).
94. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1973).
[Vol. 38
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Security State Bank v. Pierre." In that case the court considered
whether a state court had subject matter jurisdiction of an action
on a debt incurred by an enrolled tribal member with a bank located
on the reservation. The court determined that the district court did
not have jurisdiction after an application of the Iron Bear test.,
Critical to the court's determination, however, was the fact that the
tribal court had adopted a procedure whereby it could hear and
determine limited debt actions. 7
Analysis of the rule in Iron Bear and Security State Bank shows
that the court treated the presence or absence of tribal court proce-
dures as the key issue, not whether a pre-1953 cession of jurisdiction
had occurred. Although mentioning the concept of federal preemp-
tion, the Montana court did not engage in a serious examination
of the applicable treaties and statutes and certainly did not follow
the well-established canons in construing them.
The theory of residual jurisdiction has not withstood the test of
time. 8 A case on which the Montana court relied to support the
theory has been reversed;" another court facing this issue explicitly
rejected the theory.'10
G. Emergence of the Theory of Jurisdiction by Default.
After the rapid demise of the theory of residual jurisdiction, the
Montana Supreme Court formulated the theory of "jurisdiction by
default." Iron Bear and Security State Bank foreshadowed this de-
velopment by their emphasis on whether jurisdiction was actually
being exercised by the tribal court.
The jurisdiction by default concept is primarily a socio-legal
principle. It results from an apparent reluctance on the part of the
Montana Supreme Court to recognize the operation of tribal courts.
Some commentators have expressed similar reluctance.' 0' In formu-
95. 162 Mont. 298, 511 P.2d 325 (1973).
96. Id. at 327.
97. Id.
98. See Note, Indian Jurisdiction-Individual Consent to State Jurisdiction by Reser-
vation Indian Ineffective, 52 N.D. L. REv. 419 (1975); Note, State Civil Jurisdiction over
Tribal Indians-A Re-examination, supra note 3; Note, Courts-Jurisdiction-State As-
sumption of Jurisdiction Over a Divorce Action Between Enrolled Reservation Indians, 51
N.D. L. REv. 217 (1974).
99. Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957) was reversed by Gourneau
v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
100. Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). The North Dakota Supreme Court
ruled that individual acceptance of state jurisdiction was ineffective, as violating the statu-
tory requirements for transferring jurisdiction of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25
U.S.C. §§1301-41 (1970). See also Comm'r of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d
120, 126 (1970).
101. Comment, Indian Juveniles and Legislative Delinquency in Montana, 33 MoNT.
L. REv. 233 (1972); Note, Jurisdiction and the Indian Credit Problem: Considerations for a
1977]
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lating the jurisdiction by default theory, the Montana Supreme
Court has strongly relied on another misapplication of the Williams
infringement test. The Montana court has refused to find an in-
fringement upon tribal self-government unless the existing tribal
court has adopted specific procedures dealing with the subject mat-
ter involved. 102
This approach totally ignores the mandates of Kennerly and
McClanahan which require an examination of federal statutes and
treaties to discern a congressional intent to strengthen and preserve
tribal government. The requirement imposed by the Montana Su-
preme Court that specific tribal provisions corresponding to state
law must exist before tribal jurisdiction can be exercised challenges
the concept of autonomous tribal self-government by denying the
tribal government the right to choose which laws it will enact.0° It
is doubtful that Congress intended to place such a straight-jacket
on the development of Indian self-government practices and poli-
cies in its enactments providing for the strengthening of tribal self-
government and tribal court systems.
The initial transformation from the theory of residual jurisdic-
tion to the jurisdiction by default theory occurred in Bad Horse v.
Bad Horse.04 Although this case also involved the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction of a Montana court over a divorce between en-
rolled members of Indian tribes residing on Indian reservations, the
factual difference between it and the earlier Iron Bear case was that
in Bad Horse a marriage license was issued and the marriage was
entered into beyond the exterior boundaries of the reservation. At
issue was both the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the
Montana district court. In addressing the subject matter jurisdic-
tion issue, the Montana Supreme Court cited Iron Bear but empha-
sized that, in the instant case, there were significant events which
occurred off the reservation. 105 The court stressed the importance of
Solution, 33 MONT. L. REv. 307 (1972); Note, In Spite of the Law: A Social Comment on the
Impact of Kennerly and Crow Tribe, 33 MONT. L. REV. 317 (1972).
102. See discussion pp. 92-94 infra.
103. A definitive statement regarding the effect of tribal refusal to enact laws modeled
after the States was made by Judge Pederson, concurring in Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d
54, 59 (N.D. 1975), which used a federal preemption analysis to hold individual Indian
consent to state jurisdiction ineffective:
Where there is no Indian law permitting damage for injury caused by negligence,
no Indian law permitting divorce, and no Indian law levying an income tax, a
proper assumption should be that Indian law prohibits actions for damages in
negligence cases, prohibits divorce, and prohibits the levying of an income tax.
104. 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974).
105. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), not cited by Bad Horse, stands
for the proposition that, given the transitory nature of the marital status, a court may acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a divorce action, if the status is before the court and
there exists a nexus sufficient to give the state an interest in regulating it. Further support
[Vol. 38
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access to state courts for all parties, including Indians, a theme also
stressed in Iron Bear.' The court relied on the Williams infringe-
ment test in emphasizing that the tribal code provisions purportedly
transferring jurisdiction over marriage and divorces to the State
demonstrated that state jurisdiction would not interfere with tribal
government.' 7
The court then addressed the question of whether the state
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, since she was
served in Poplar, Montana, within the boundaries of the Fort Peck
Indian Reservation.' °8 The court held that the district court had
personal jurisdiction of the parties based on service of the parties
under Rule 4 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.'" The court
relied on a similar ruling in New Mexico."'0 Jurisdictions applying
the federal preemption analysis have ruled otherwise, however,
holding that, absent specific congressional consent, state service of
process within an Indian reservation is void."'
This was the status of Montana Indian jurisdiction law prior to
the three recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.
The Montana court decisions discussed above heavily rely on the
Williams infringement test, broadly applying that test when tribal
governments have not risen to the occasion and passed expansive
tribal legislation dealing with the subject of the jurisdictional dis-
pute. There was an overriding concern with allowing access to state
courts and not depriving Indian persons of civil rights by limiting
such access. The Montana cases also cited the extension of state
services to reservations, and expressed apprehension about a consid-
erable body of law that seemingly relieved Indians of carrying their
share of the burden of financing these services by exempting them
from state taxation."12
for a jurisdictional theory based on the presence of significant off-reservation facts is Fisher
v. District Court discussed at pp. 82-87 infra.
106. Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, 895 (1973), cert. denied 419
U.S. 847 (1974). The court's expressed concern that the lack of tribal remedy for divorce left
tribal members without a remedy in absence of state court jurisdiction, has played a major
role in the Montana Supreme Court's analysis of Indian jurisdiction cases. But see discussion
of Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54, 59 (N.D. 1975) at note 103, supra.
107. Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, 896 (1973).
108. Id. at 896.
109. Id. at 897.
110. State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973).
111. Francisco v. State, - Ariz. __, 556 P.2d 1 (1976); Martin v. Denver Juvenile
Court, 177 Colo. 261, 493 P.2d 1093 (1972). See also Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335
F.Supp. 133, 136 (D.S.D. 1971); Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174
N.W.2d 120, 126 (1970). It has been argued that an independent legal basis may exist to
validate state service of process on an Indian reservation. If the purpose of service is to grant
the party notice and an opportunity to be heard, service under a long arm statute may be
sufficient. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
112. See also Judge Smith's dissent in the lower court decision of Confederated Salish
19771
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III. THE 1976 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Fisher v. District Court
In August 1974, Leroy and Josephine Runsabove, enrolled
members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, filed a petition in the
Montana District Court for the Sixteenth Judicial District for the
adoption of Ivan Firecrow, a minor. The adoption was contested by
the natural mother of the child, Alva Fisher, also an enrolled mem-
ber of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe."' All parties to the action lived
on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Various aspects of the cus-
tody of the minor child previously had been litigated in tribal court.
After the Runsaboves filed their petition in state court, the
district court judge certified to the appellate court of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe the question of whether an ordinance of the North-
ern Cheyenne Tribe conferred jurisdiction upon the district court.
The tribal appellate court held that tribal ordinances gave the
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court exclusive jurisdiction over adop-
tions if all parties are members of the Tribe and reside on the reser-
vation. As a result of this ruling, the state district court dismissed
the petition for adoption holding that the state court lacked juris-
diction over the subject matter of the action.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district
court."' Prior to the Tribe's adoption of the Indian Reorganization
and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F.Supp. 1297, 1317-24 (1975), aff'd, Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
113. The Northern Cheyenne Tribe is a federally recognized Indian Tribe incorporated
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U.S.C. §461 (1970). Under the Tribal Constitu-
tion approved by the Secretary of Interior pursuant to this Act, the Tribal Council has the
right to regulate the domestic relations of members of the Tribe and of non-members married
into the Tribe and also to provide for the appointment of guardians for minors and mentally
incompetent members. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Constitution Article IV, Section 1, Nov-
ember 23, 1935. This Constitution has since been superseded by the Amended Constitution
and By-laws of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, July 8, 1960. Pursuant to the Tribal Constitu-
tion, the Revised Law and Order Ordinances of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe specifically
detailed the adoption procedure in the Tribal Court, as follows:
Adoptions. The Tribal Court of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation shall have
jurisdiction to hear, pass upon and approve applications of adoptions among mem-
bers of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe.
Upon proper showing and decision by the Court, such adoption shall be binding
upon all concerned and hereafter only, adoptions so approved by the Tribal Court
shall be recognized. On all adoptions involving non-members of the Northern Chey-
enne Tribe or non-Indians or both who wish to adopt a member of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe, the tribal court of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to hear, pass upon and approve applications for adoption
and upon written consent of the court, adoption proceedings affecting members of
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation may be taken
up and consummated by the state courts.
114. State ex rel. Firecrow v. District Court, - Mont. -. , 536 P.2d 190 (1975), rev'd
per curiam sub nor. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
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Act in 1935, Montana's state courts possessed subject-matter juris-
diction over adoptions by enrolled members of the Northern Chey-
enne Tribe. The Montana Supreme Court held that the Tribe could
not unilaterally deprive the state court of jurisdiction by passing a
Tribal ordinance to the contrary. The court also stated that Con-
gress, in passing certain legislation defining heirs by adoption,"'
implicitly recognized state court jurisdiction over adoptions by
tribal Indians."' The court said that to deny the Runsaboves access
to state courts because they were tribal members would deprive
them of equal protection under the laws."7
Appealed as Fisher v. District Court,"' this case presented the
United States Supreme Court with a case of first impression in
deciding whether a tribe could effectively transfer subject matter
jurisdiction to a State prior to the enactment of Public Law 280. In
reviewing the Montana Supreme Court's decision, the United
States Supreme Court traced the history of the self-government
concept as applied to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. In 1877, Con-
gress ratified an agreement between the Tribe and the United States
in which the government promised to secure an orderly government
for the Tribe."' This agreement was enhanced by the language of
Montana's Enabling Act in which Montana agreed that "Indian
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
Congress of the United States .. ."I'0 The Court enumerated the
Congressional statutes relating to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and
stated that Congress specifically intended the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act to revitalize Indian self-government. It concluded that fed-
eral statutes had preempted subject matter jurisdiction and that
exercise of state jurisdiction interfered with the powers of tribal self-
government. The Court said:
The Tribal ordinance conferring jurisdiction on the Tribal Court
was authorized by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 476. Consequently, it implements an overriding federal policy
which is clearly adequate to defeat state jurisdiction over litigation
involving reservation Indians."'
The Supreme Court reserved ruling on whether a tribal council
enactment prior to the effective date of Public Law 280 is sufficient
115. Act of July 8, 1940, ch. 555, § § 1, 2, 54 Stat. 746 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 372a (1970)).
116. State ex rel. Firecrow v. District Court, - Mont. -, 536 P.2d 190, 193 (1975),
rev'd per curiam sub nom. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
117. Id. at 193.
118. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
119. Act of February 28, 1877, Article VIII, 19 Stat. 254-56.
120. Act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, Sec. 4.
121. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976).
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to confer residual jurisdiction to a state court. 2 ' After finding in the
Indian Reorganization Act a federal policy to defeat state jurisdic-
tion, the Court held that by implementing that Act in 1935, the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe preempted state jurisdiction.'2 3 In es-
sence, the Court defined the Indian Reorganization Act as a govern-
ing act of Congress in much the same manner as Kennerly had
defined Public Law 280.
Conceivably, a tribe that did not incorporate under the Indian
Reorganization Act would not have been faced with a federal act
preempting state jurisdiction until Public Law 280 was enacted in
1953.23. 1 During that time, tribal councils arguably could have uni-
laterally transferred jurisdiction to state courts.24 The effect of such
transfers of jurisdiction remains unanswered by Fisher, although the
congressional intent to preserve tribal self-government and forbid
unilateral transfers of jurisdiction, an intent the Supreme Court
found in the Indian Reorganization Act and other federal statutes
and treaties, indicates what the court may hold in the future.
Fisher is a clearer and broader expansion of the preemption
analysis approach begun in Kennerly and developed in McClana-
han. Fisher requires jurisdiction to be determined by examining
treaties involving the particular Indian tribe and by examining
federal legislation to determine if Congress intended the state to
assume jurisdiction.'
One troublesome point relating to the treatment of the preemp-
tion analysis as an emerging jurisdictional doctrine and the continu-
122. Id. at 390. Fisher's treatment of the "overriding federal policy" to preempt state
jurisdiction may, when viewed together with Public Law 280 and the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, support the argument that the later enactments divested the state courts of jurisdic-
tion they previously exercised, correctly or incorrectly, by providing a formal procedure for
assumption of jurisdiction which, absent such formal assumption, results in the loss of all
jurisdiction.
123. Id.
123.1. Under the Fisher preemption analysis, however, the federal intent to preempt
state jurisdiction could be derived from the treaties or other statutes establishing the parti-
cular reservation regardless of whether the tribe adopted the Indian Reorganization Act. See
25 U.S.C. § 478b (1970).
124. For example, Crow Tribal Resolution dated February 18, 1946, as modified by
Crow Tribal Resolution dated February 15, 1953, states that all marriages and divorces
between tribal members shall be performed according to state law. It is noteworthy that,
under the Fisher analysis, the transfer of marriage and divorce jurisdiction by the Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Council in 1937 was ineffective because the federal government preempted
the area in 1935 by virtue of that Tribe's acceptance of the Indian Reorganization Act. This
1937 transfer was the subject of the Bad Horse decision. See discussion pp. 80-81, supra.
125. The preemption analysis draws its support from the backdrop of Indian sover-
eignty as outlined in McClanahan which requires an analysis of all applicable treaties and
statutes relating to the Tribe or Tribes involved in the jurisdictional transfer. The preemption
test finds its source in the plenary and exclusive power of the federal government to deal with
Indian tribes. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 n. 11 (1975).
[Vol. 38
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ing use of the Williams infringement test arose in Fisher when the
Court applied the infringement test to litigation involving only Indi-
ans. "Since this litigation involves only Indians, at best the same
standard, [the infringement test] must be met before state courts
can exercise jurisdiction."'26
Although the Williams test continues to be used, the Supreme
Court in Fisher clearly emphasized the dominance of the preemp-
tion analysis. First, applicable federal treaties and legislation must
be analyzed. If from analyzing such legislation, one gleans a con-
gressional intent to preempt the field, state exercise of jurisdiction
would, by definition, interfere with tribal self-government. Because
Fisher does not exclude the Williams test when an examination of
treaties and statutes fails to reveal federal preemption but does
reveal infringement with tribal self-government, it does not defi-
nitely establish when, where, and how the Williams test is to be
applied in such situations.
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that denial of
state court subject matter jurisdiction constituted racial discrimi-
nation without justification. "The exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather
from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
under federal law."'2 7 In holding that the absence of state court
subject matter jurisdiction is part of the federal government's policy
to recognize tribal self-government,I the Supreme Court put to rest
the argument that the denial of state jurisdiction is discrimination
based on race. 9
The Supreme Court also dealt with the argument raised by
proponents of state court subject matter jurisdiction that certain
facts in the case occurred off-reservation. The Court distinguished
"incidents of marginal relevance" which would not affect jurisdic-
tion over the adoption from those facts which, if off-reservation
would substantially affect jurisdiction. 3° Also, one of the main
126. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976). This wording conflicts with the
treatment accorded the infringement test in McClanahan which limited that test to situations
involving non-Indians. See discussion p. 73 supra. The broadening of the principle by
Fisher has caused a rebirth of the Williams test in the "jurisdiction by default" theory of Old
Elk and Stops discussed below.
127. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976).
128. Id. at 391.
129. The state court's argument that denial of access to state courts because of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction constituted racial discrimination is at State ex rel. Firecrow v.
District Court, - Mont. __, 536 P.2d 190, 193 (1975).
130. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 n. 14 (1975). Along these lines, one of
the least cited cases in Montana Indian law is the case of In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495
P.2d 179 (1972). In this case both the mother and the illegitimate minor child in question
were members of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes and resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reserva-
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reasons for the finding of state jurisdiction by the Montana Su-
preme Court in Bad Horse was the existence of off-reservation facts
such as the issuance of the marriage license and the marriage itself,
both occurring in Forsyth, Montana. Therefore, it is possible that
the Bad Horse ruling could be justified on a newly emerging theory
predicated on the existence of substantial off-reservation facts.,3' It
is also conceivable that the presence of off-reservation facts such as
in off-reservation adoptions of Indian children by non-Indians might
lead to a judicial rationale recognizing concurrent jurisdiction.'3
tion in northeastern Montana. The mother placed her child at a babysitter's home on the
reservation on May 15, 1970. Prior to the mother's return, the putative father of the child
took the child from the babysitter's home and, three days later, left the reservation with the
child en route by train to Glasgow, Montana, which is located beyond the exterior boundaries
of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. During the train ride, the father became intoxicated.
At the stop in Glasgow, the welfare department took the child from its father and placed him
in a foster home. The mother argued that there was no evidence of neglect attributable to
her which took place beyond the boundaries of the reservation, and therefore the state court
had no jurisdiction to declare the child dependent and neglected. While there were other facts
of neglect attributable to the mother committed while on the reservation which may in part
have been the basis for the child's disposition, the court responded to the mother's contention
in the following language:
[T]he 'fact' of neglect, that of abandonment of a helpless infant, occurred off the
reservation and continued for over a year off the reservation. The mother's only
effort, to all practical purposes, was to remain in the sanctuary of the reservation,
oblivious to the needs of her child. This fact alone removes the case from the
heretofore cited Indian jurisdiction cases.
Id. at 182.
131. This theory, if indeed it is one, is difficult to maintain in view of the case law that
recognizes tribal self-government, particularly in the field of domestic relations. United
States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). Felix Cohen stated in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
41, at 138:
The fact that Indians may obtain marriage licenses from state officials does not
deprive the tribe of jurisdiction to issue a divorce where the parties are properly
before the tribal court. In this respect Indians are in the same position as persons
who, after marrying under the law of one state, may be divorced under the law of
another state or a foreign nation.
See also White v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
829 (1959), which denied state jurisdiction over a divorce action between two enrolled tribal
members where the marriage was entered into on a reservation.
132. United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), was an appeal
from a Montana case involving facts from both state and tribal jurisdictions. There, a state
court granted a divorce between two members of the Blackfeet Tribe, both of whom lived off
the reservation. The custody of the minor children, who also lived off the reservation, was
originally awarded to the father but the court later modified the decree to award custody to
the mother. While appeal of that decision was pending in the Montana Supreme Court, the
mother and the children moved back to the Blackfeet reservation, and the Tribal court
awarded temporary custody of the children to the grandmother, also a tribal member residing
on the reservation.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the state district court and awarded custody to
the father. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the state court's jurisdiction over
custody matters was continuing, and that the father was entitled to custody. In so ruling,
the court made some comments that are inconsistent with jurisdictional theories derived from
Kennerly and McClanahan. The court remarked that the couple submitted themselves to the
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Whatever the final outcome, the Supreme Court has left the door
open for a test that would examine off-reservation facts as a basis
for determining whether a state court has subject matter jurisdic-
tion.'33
In sum, Fisher refined the preemption theory of Kennerly and
McClanahan and answered some of the questions raised in prior
state court decisions.' 34
B. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes' considered
two actions brought by the Tribes against the State of Montana.
The first action' 36 arose from an incident in which Joseph Wheeler,
an enrolled tribal member, leased two tracts of tribal trust land to
operate smoke shops. Wheeler did not obtain a state cigarette retail
license nor did he pay the state tax which allowed cigarette pack-
ages to bear the state revenue stamp. The State, through its county
sheriff, arrested Wheeler for these two misdemeanor offenses.
Wheeler and the tribes then instituted an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief in a three judge federal district court against the
application of the state cigarette tax and the vendor licensing stat-
utes as applied to tribal members who sold cigarettes within the
reservation. In the second related matter, 37 the Tribes and some of
their members brought an action against the State to have the state
personal property tax on motor vehicles declared invalid with re-
jurisdiction of the state court voluntarily and that the Blackfeet tribal code disclaimed
jurisdiction over marriages and divorces and, consequently, over custody issues that are
related to divorce. It is impossible, in view of Kennerly, that this disclaimer was a proper
tribal transfer of jurisdiction.
These situations are not easily resolved. The issue of concurrent jurisdiction is one that
will likely confuse the resolution of jurisdiction issues even in light of the emergence of the
preemption doctrine.
133. It is interesting that the case relied on in the Fisher footnote, DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 1082 (1975), involved a question of interpretation of a cession act,
and therefore involved a part of the reservation that arguably may have been on the reserva-
tion. The case itself does not deal with a clear situation of off-reservation facts. This off-
reservation facts theory is inconsistent with decisions regarding custody of Indian children
in which lower courts have insisted that the fact of domicile or residence on the reservation
precludes state jurisdiction to determine custody even if the child is found off-reservation.
Wakefield v. Littlelight, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975); Wisconsin Potowatomies v.
Houston, 393 F.Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973). These decisions would therefore conflict with
the holdings of Bad Horse and Cantrell.
134. However, in the wake of Fisher, a practical problem arises in Montana in that the
state agencies charged with recording vital human statistics refuse to record tribal decrees
including such statistics. Other jurisdictions have given full faith and credit to tribal decrees.
See, e.g., Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950). The failure to do so in Montana
actually reduces the practical effect of Fisher, and may require further litigation to clarify.
135. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
136. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975).
137. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mont. 1975).
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spect to motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing within the
reservation boundaries.
The three judge court invalidated both taxes as applied to Indi-
ans but allowed the State of Montana to impose its tax on sales of
cigarettes to non-Indian purchasers.' 8 The State appealed the deci-
sion invalidating the taxes to the United States Supreme Court, and
the Tribe cross-appealed the district court's ruling applying the
state tax to sales of cigarettes to non-Indians.
In its decision,'39 the Supreme Court initially responded to the
State's procedural argument, holding that the suits brought by the
Tribe were not barred by a federal statute40 which prohibited fed-
eral courts from enjoining assessment of state taxes where a speedy
remedy was offered in state court.'4'
On the merits of the case, the State attempted to distinguish
the facts in Moe from the Court's decision in McClanahan by argu-
ing that the manner in which the Flathead Reservation developed
to its present state distinguished it from the factual setting of the
Navajo Reservation.' The State also argued that there was a spe-
cific federal statutory basis permitting Montana to impose its tax
laws, including both cigarette and personal property taxes, on the
Flathead Reservation.'4 3 The State argued that as a result of the
General Allotment Act,"' the State continued to possess taxing ju-
risdiction over Indians living on fee patented lands.
In responding to the first argument, the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the findings of the District Court and held that since the
Salish and Kootenai Tribes had not abandoned their tribal organi-
zation, the state of reservation development was not a basis for
distinguishing McClanahan. "I The Court thus laid to rest many of
the social arguments relied on by lower courts to justify the exten-
sion of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations.
138. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975).
139. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
141. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976). The
Court ruled that the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970), which gave district courts
original jurisdiction of all civil actions brought by any Indian Tribe for matters and contro-
versies arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of United States indicates that, in
certain respects, Indian Tribes suing under this section were to be accorded treatment similar
to that of the United States suing on behalf of the Tribe as its trustee. Therefore, since the
United States was not barred under § 1341, neither would the Tribe be barred. Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 472-75 (1976). See also Moses v.
Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973), where the Ninth Circuit extended the federal instrumen-
tality theory a step further to allow individual Indians an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1341 where
the government could technically be a co-plaintiff in the suit.
142. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976).
143. Id. at 476.
144. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970).
145. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976).
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After noting that the relevant treaties and statutes were essen-
tially the same as in McClanahan,' the Court responded to the
State's second argument. The Court indicated that the creation of
checkerboard jurisdiction which would necessitate a title search on
each parcel of land before determining jurisdiction was contrary to
the intent of the federal statutory law of Indian jurisdiction. 4 7 The
Court also pointed out that the apparent congressional purpose in
the General Allotment Act of 1887 of gradually abolishing reserva-
tions was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act.'48
The State argued that the practice of exempting Indians living
within the reservation but not exempting non-Indians living within
the reservation from taxes is discrimination without justification.
The Supreme Court dismissed that argument holding that there was
a rational basis for such a distinction.' The test which the Court
applied to determine whether unjustifiable discimination exists was
taken from its decision in Morton v. Mancari'50 wherein it was
stated: "As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians,
such legislative judgments will not be disturbed."'' This ruling sup-
ports Fisher and should finally eliminate the discrimination argu-
ment as a basis for asserting state jurisdiction. The Court reaffirmed
the ruling in McClanahan that, in the absence of federal legislation
authorizing such jurisdiction, the State is without general civil regu-
latory authority over Indians and their property located within the
reservation. More importantly, Moe holds that in addition to deter-
mining congressional intent regarding jurisdictional matters by ref-
erence to treaties and statutes, it is necessary to examine all federal
legislation to determine whether Congress has changed its earlier
policies with regard to Indians and Indian Tribes. Federal legisla-
tion is to be read in its totality to determine the present congres-
sional policy toward Indians.
Because the State did not challenge it on appeal, the Supreme
Court did not disturb the three judge court's ruling that the exemp-
tion from the cigarette tax applied to all Indians living on the Flat-
head Reservation regardless of whether they were enrolled members
of the plaintiff Tribe.' The Court allowed the state to collect the
146. Id. at 477.
147. Id. at 478, citing Seymour v. Superintendent 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
148. Id. at 479. Cf. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 & n.18 (1973).
149. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976).
150. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974).
151. Id. at 555.
152. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480-81 n.16 (1976).
See also Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969); Fox v. Bureau of
Revenue, 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (1975); White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.
1973).
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tax on sales of cigarettes from an Indian seller to a non-Indian
buyer. The Court indicated it was not a burden sufficient enough
to be deemed an infringement under the test enunciated in Williams
v. Lee.'5 3 While disagreement may abound as to the degree of in-
fringement involved, perhaps this situation, involving relations be-
tween Indians and non-Indians and the exercise of a legitimate state
power over its non-Indian citizens, comes closest of all the cases
discussed herein to the proper situation in which the Williams in-
fringement test applies.' 54
In essence, Moe strengthened the preemption theory and em-
phasized its priority over the Williams infringement test for deter-
mining state jurisdiction in matters involving Indians on Indian
reservations. 5
C. Bryan v. Itasca County
In Bryan v. Itasca County'56 the United States Supreme Court
again considered whether a State had the general civil regulatory
authority to levy a tax within the confines of an Indian reservation.
In this instance, the tax was a personal property tax assessed
against a mobile home located on the Leech Lake Indian Reserva-
tion in Minnesota and owned by an enrolled tribal member who
resided on the reservation. Bryan differed from Moe and
McClanahan in that Minnesota was one of the States granted juris-
diction over Indians by virtue of Public Law 280.' 51 The Minnesota
Supreme Court had ruled that while there was no express grant of
taxation authority to the State, the provisions of Public Law 280
were nonetheless an implied grant of the power to tax.' 5
In considering whether the State of Minnesota had such a
power to tax reservation Indians, the Supreme Court looked to the
legislative history of Public Law 280,151 discerning that the primary
153. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976).
154. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and
Economic Resources, No. BC-CS 76-65 (W.D.N.C., filed Aug. 27, 1976), which held that the
collection of a state fishing license fee from a non-Indian fisherman within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation was a direct infringement on the tribe's right to govern and
regulate fishing by a tribal permit system. The district court went into great detail in
examining the application of the state license fee and the tribal license fee to make its
determination under the Williams infringement test. This case may provide further guide-
lines for proper application of the Williams test.
155. For a law review article dealing with the lower court's decision in Moe as well as
other taxation cases pending in federal courts at that time, see Comment, Must the Paleface
Pay to Puff? Confederated Salish & Kootenai v. Moe, 35 MONT. L. REv. 83 (1975).
156. 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976).
157. See note 19, supra.
158. Bryan v. Itasca County, - Minn. ., 228 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1975), rev'd, 96
S.Ct. 2102 (1976).
159. For an extensive analysis of Public Law 280, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The
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purpose of Public Law 280 was to apply state criminal laws to crimes
occurring on Indian reservations, and particularly, to tribes without
adequate institutions for law enforcement.' 6 There was an absence
of express congressional policy or intent on the issue of what civil
jurisdiction was granted to the states.'6 ' After viewing other sections
of Public Law 280 that dealt with civil jurisdiction, the Court con-
cluded the main intent of Congress was to provide state courts as a
forum to resolve such disutes when there was no tribal court. ' The
Court therefore held Public Law 280 inadequate to grant taxation
power to the states.6 3 This interpretation applies to most state at-
tempts to exercise general civil regulatory powers on the reserva-
tion.' 4
In Bryan, the Court summarized its earlier rulings on preemp-
tion and formulated in footnote 2 of the opinion a "general pre-
emption analysis", citing Moe and McClanahan but not limiting
the preemption analysis to the taxation area.'65 This statement,
along with the Court's treatment of Fisher, implies that the Court
is ready to adopt such a preemption analysis for the determination
of all state-tribal jurisdictional problems. '6
Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L.REv. 535 (1975).
160. Bryan v. Itasca County, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2107 (1976).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2110.
163. Id. at 2112.
164. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). The Mescalero
case, cited in footnote 2 in Bryan, is often cited by advocates of state jurisdiction. However,
Mescalero goes a long way toward setting some specific guidelines for defining the scope and
limits on the exercise of state jurisdiction.
At issue in Mescalero were two taxes that the State of New Mexico was attempting to
impose on a ski lodge owned by the Navajo Tribe but operated off-reservation. The first tax
was a gross receipts tax on income earned from the lodge. The second tax was a use tax on
two ski lifts that were purchased out of State for use on the off-reservation property. The court
held the gross receipts tax valid since the activity was conducted off-reservation, but invalida-
ted the use tax on the grounds that the use of permanent improvements on tax-exempt land
was protected under the Indian Reorganization Act. The decree states:
[11n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority in taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries
of the reservation and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona . . . lays
to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible
absent congressional consent.
Id. at 148.
Therefore, Mescalero is a stonger case for lack of state jurisdiction over reservation activities
than is generally credited.
165. Bryan v. Itasca County, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2105 n.2 (1976).
166. A federal preemption analysis was applied by the Arizona Supreme Court in Fran-
cisco v. State, - Ariz. -, 556 P.2d 1 (1976), in determining that a state court had no
personal jurisdiction over a Papago Indian served within the reservation by a state officer.
The Arizona court found that under Kennerly and McClanahan, Public Law 280 and the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 were "governing acts of Congress" which preempted the
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By enumerating some guidelines for statutory construction in
this area, Bryan contains hints about the attitude of the United
States Supreme Court toward the jurisdiction by default concept.
The recent Supreme Court cases stand for the proposition that fed-
eral legislation is to be examined to ascertain the congressional
intent to preserve tribal self-government and that state jurisdiction
is therefore precluded unless expressly authorized.
IV. THE RECENT MONTANA CASES
A. State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court
State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court"7 involved an enrolled
member of the Crow Tribe who was charged with deliberate homi-
cide for the death of a non-Indian which occurred beyond the exte-
rior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. The Sheriff of Big
Horn County served the complaint and warrant on the accused
within the reservation boundaries and then transported him to the
Big Horn County Jail. The Crow Tribal Court Judge refused to
recognize the sheriff's warrant. The Montana Supreme Court up-
held the validity of the arrest, holding that because the Crow Tribe
had established no procedure for extradition with the State, the on-
reservation arrest by state peace officers did not interfere with tribal
self-government. 6 '
The Court distinguished State ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle 9 which
was relied on by the accused. The court noted that the Crow Tribe
in Old Elk unlike the Navajo Tribe in Merrill had not enacted a
tribal code provision dealing with extradition. Therefore, it was held
that Montana could exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the failure or
default of the tribal court. 7 ° It is arguable that the result in Old Elk
could be justified on principles of criminal law rather than Indian
law. '7 However, the validity of such an approach, as well as the
exercise of state jurisdiction over Indian lands. Id. at 3. After examining the executive orders,
and statutes relevant to the Papago Tribe, the court concluded that the state had no power
to make service of process to Indians on Indian lands because the State had failed to take
the necessary steps to acquire jurisdiction under either of the governing acts. Id. at 5. The
court noted specifically that the state court had valid subject matter jurisdiction, but that
valid service could only be obtained through Papago Indian authorities. Id. at 2 n.1.
167. __ Mont. -, 552 P.2d 1394 (1976).
168. Id. at 1397.
169. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969). In this case the Navajo Tribe had enacted an extradi-
tion procedure but did not have an agreement with the State (Oklahoma) which was attempt-
ing to extradite from the Navajo reservation. Also, the state's custody in Turtle depended on
extradition, whereas in Old Elk it was based on personal custody as there was probable cause
to believe he committed the crime.
170. State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, - Mont. __, 552 P.2d 1394, 1397 (1976).
171. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the power of a court to try and
convict a person of a crime is not impaired by the fact that he was forcibly abducted across
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jurisdictional position of the Montana court in Old Elk, has been
challenged by a recent New Mexico Supreme Court decision?2
which involved an issue similar to that in Old Elk. The New Mexico
court based its decision on consideration of Indian law and carefully
examined the existing criminal law precedent in the area. The court
held that arrest was illegal as a violation of tribal sovereignty,
thereby requiring the defendant's release because of principles of
due process.'7 3
B. Littlehorn State Bank v. Stops.
In Littlehorn State Bank v. Stops,'74 enrolled members of the
Crow Tribe obtained a loan from a bank located in Hardin, Mon-
tana, a town located beyond the exterior boundaries of the Crow
Indian reservation. Upon a default in the loan payments, the bank
sued in state district court. Process was served on the respondents
within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. The
bank obtained a judgment and proceeded to execute on the wages
of one of the Indian respondents which were earned on the reserva-
tion. The respondent obtained an injunction against the execution
in the state district court, but the Montana Supreme Court vacated
it on appeal.
Although the Montana court was concerned with the presence
of off-reservation facts and the apparent inability to enforce a judg-
ment legally obtained, it reversed the district court relying on the
Williams infringement test. In the absence of a tribal code provision
for enforcement of state court judgments, the court reasoned there
could be no interference with tribal self-government.' The court
reaffirmed its holding in Old Elk that once a court properly has
subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy, its process may ex-
state lines to bring him within the jurisdiction of the court. See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519 (1952); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); Kern v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886).
However, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), directly repudiates
the reasoning of Frisbie in holding that a more expanded view of due process requires the
release of a defendant from custody where the arrest has violated his civil rights.
172. Bennally v. Marcum, __ N.M. -, 553 P.2d 1270 (1976). This case involved
an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe who was arrested on the Navajo reservation for
violations of city ordinances of Farmington, New Mexico, located beyond the boundaries of
the Navajo Reservation. There are factual differences between this case and Old Elk: the
Navajo Tribe did have an extradition procedure, whereas the Crow Tribe did not; the offense
in Old Elk was murder whereas the offenses in Bennally were DWI and reckless driving
resulting in property damage. In the author's view, these distinctions do not justify a different
result in Old Elk.
173. Id. at 1271, 1274.
174. - Mont. __, 555 P.2d 211 (1976).
175. Id. at 214.
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tend within the boundaries of the reservation. "' Finally, the court
emphasized that the Williams test was the proper test to apply
because of the off-reservation facts: the litigation involved a mem-
ber of the Tribe living on the reservation, and a non-member located
off the reservation; the transaction arose off the reservation.'" The
Stops decision is in direct conflict with the holdings of other juris-
dictions.""
C. The Continuing Misapplication of Williams v. Lee
Both Old Elk and Stops were decided after the Fisher, Moe and
Bryan decisions. In neither case did the Montana court follow a
preemption analysis nor did it deal with the question of transfer of
jurisdiction prior to Public Law 280 or the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act as it did in the Iron Bear'75 and Bad Horse10 cases. Indeed, the
Montana Supreme Court's reasoning in Old Elk and Stops is in
direct conflict with the court's holdings in Deernose'' and
Blackwolf,'5 2 cases which, in the aftermath of Kennerly, basically
espoused a preemption analysis. The court did not, however, over-
rule either of these latter two cases. Furthermore, the theory of Old
Elk and Stops, which predicates state jurisdiction upon the failure
of tribal courts to specifically assume jurisdiction over a given sub-
ject matter is in conflict with the rationale of the decisions of
Kennerly and McClanahan as well as of Fisher, Moe and Bryan. The
"jurisdiction by default" theory of Old Elk and Stops ignores the
congressional policy of strengthening tribal government. Taking the
theory to its logical conclusion, the State must divest itself of juris-
diction once the tribe, through its tribal court, enacts appropriate
laws to handle a given situation. That result would likely not be
welcomed by proponents of the theory. Although the rationale for
this theory is the expressed concern over a lack of remedy, such a
situation is not unique to Indian law; often people are left without
a remedy because of procedural limitations based on public policy
(such as the Statute of Frauds, and Statutes of Limitations). Ulti-
176. Id.
177. Id. at 213. The court relied on the statement in Fisher applying the Williams test
to situations involving only Indians within reservation boundaries thus compounding the
confusion created by the Supreme Court's apparent inconsistency in the McClanahan and
Fisher decisions.
178. Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971); Lee v. Perry, No.
75-059 (D.N.M. 1975); See also Francisco v. State, - Ariz. -, 556 P.2d 1 (1976); LaFon-
taine, Indian Property and State Judgment Executions, 52 ORE.L.REv. 313 (1973).
179. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1973).
180. Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
847 (1974).
181. Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971).
182. Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972).
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mately, the creation of remedies in Indian law, however, is for the
tribes and Congress, not for the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
With the most recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court, Indian jurisdictional law is developing concrete standards
upon which one can determine whether state jurisdiction exists.
Although some problems remain unresolved, the rationale of Fisher,
Moe and Bryan shows that, in the absence of special congressional
authority, a State is without jurisdiction to impose its courts or its
general regulatory authority over Indians or Indian tribes within the
exterior boundaries of their reservations. The preemption theory
defined in those cases is the primary test for determining the exist-
ence of state jurisdiction.
The socio-legal arguments upon which many a state court has
based its extension of state jurisdiction have been expressly repu-
diated by the Fisher-Moe-Bryan rationale. At least implicitly, the
more subtle rationales of residual jurisdiction and jurisdiction by
default have likewise been rejected.
Some confusion remains as to the application of the Williams
infringement test. This test was thought to have provided a rule of
thumb to determine the existence of state jurisdiction. The recent
decisions by the United States Supreme Court, however, undermine
the general applicability of this standard. The Williams test may
be superfluous in those instances in which Congress has preempted
state jurisdiction. Nevertheless, recent decisions have caused confu-
sion by continuing to apply the rule in an inconsistent manner.
While McClanahan limited the test to transactions involving non-
Indians, Fisher applied the rule to situations in which all parties
were Indians residing within the confines of an Indian reservation.
This inconsistency among the United States Supreme Court
cases has resulted in the development of Montana Indian law case
precedent built upon an extension of the Williams test, allowing
state courts to assume jurisdiction even where tribal courts exist, if
the tribe has not specifically provided a tribal court procedure to
treat the problem raised in the jurisdictional dispute. Although this
theory of "jurisdiction by default" pinpoints the small discrepancies
in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it is doubtful
whether such a rule will withstand the test of time under the broad
preemption analysis of Fisher, Moe and Bryan.
Perhaps the best comments addressing the application of the
Williams test and the potential for its abuse are found in Justice
Haswell's concurring opinion in Iron Bear:
1977]
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I concur in the result, but in my view the rationale of the majority
opinion is flawed. In my opinion this will lead to no end of difficul-
ties in future Indian jurisdictional cases that may come before this
court.
The majority opinion is predicated on the jurisdictional test
set forth in Williams v. Lee [citation omitted]. . . In one of the
latest cases discussing the Williams test, the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out that this test was useful in situations involving the
rights of Indians and non-Indians where both the Tribe and the
state court fairly claim jurisdiction. McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission [citation omitted].
. . . In the instant case, the situation is entirely different.
This case involves the respective rights of two reservation Indians
in a divorce case in a mutually acceptable forum with no assertion
of antagonistic jurisdictional interests between the tribe, the state,
the two Indians, or the federal government. The Williams test
simply has no application to this situation and its continued indis-
criminate application to all Indian jurisdictional questions in this
Court is a mistake. Continued adherence to the Williams test has
previously resulted in reversals in the judgments of this court. See
Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S. Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d
507.183
By its recent holdings in Old Elk and Stops the Montana court
has definitely made the Williams test the crucial basis of its deci-
sions. The potential for resolving the issue of the proper application
of the Williams test is increasing by virtue of the Montana rulings
and the lack of clarity in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on this point.
183. State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1973).
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